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1 INTRODUCTION 
Competitive tendering is now a well-established practice in several European 
countries, and is still spreading to further areas. The most common practice is 
tendering at the operational level, using gross cost contracts, were the 
authorities are responsible for the tactical level. Recently, further initiatives are 
taken to introduce tendering and contracting at the tactical level, and 
transferring more responsibility for planning and product development to the 
operator (Henscher and Houghton 2004, Johansen et al 2001, Van de Velde 
and Pruijmboon 2003). 
The main objective of these initiatives was to enhance service quality 
improvements by giving more freedom to the operators (i.e. deregulation at 
the tactical level) in return for a clearer definition of the public transport targets 
by the authorities (i.e. regulation at the strategic level).  
The objective of this paper is to compare two recent initiatives to introduce 
qualitative measures either in the tendering procedures or the contractual 
clauses, both aimed at delegating more service design freedom to the 
operator: The first initiative is taken from the Dutch experiences with tendering 
at the tactical level, and the second from the very first tendering of a 
performance-based subsidy contract in Norway.  
The Dutch experiences offer several innovating and promising ways to 
introduce tactical freedom and competition at the tendering stage. Some of 
the examples even led to huge innovation and changes in design from 
previous networks and quite a large increase in service provision. The Dutch 
evidence seems less convincing when it comes to service innovation during 
the contractual period, at least for the time being. This can partly be explained 
by the fact that all cases analysed relied on net-cost contracts without any 
further incentives for market development. The operators are thus faced with 
all the burdens of market failures without being offered real potential of 
earnings in correspondence with the risks they endure.  
To tender out a performance-based subsidy contract, as used in the Telemark 
county of Norway, increases the income potential for the operators by 
introducing strong incentives in addition to ticket revenue. The operators 
subsequently bid for the right to operate contracts with such super-incentives 
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and the level of freedom included with them. The risk dilemma that revealed 
itself in the Dutch cases is thereby balanced by super-incentives for market 
development. In many respect this solution offers a novel and promising way 
of combining aims of cost and service efficient regime both at the static 
tendering stage and during the more dynamic contractual period.  
The objective of this paper will be to discuss the interaction between quality 
tendering and quality contracting, and the balance between financial 
incentives and level of freedom for the operator. 
 
2 COMPETITIVE TENDERING AND COST EFFICIENCY  
Tendering of gross-cost contracts is still the most common way of competitive 
tendering in Europe (van de Velde 2003). This means that all passenger 
revenue goes back to the authorities and that the operators bid for the 
operating costs of the contract. Thus the operators have few - if any - 
incentives to focus on improving income and developing public transport 
provisions beyond reducing production costsi. The advantage of the type of 
competition is that it gives maximum control to the authorities, it is simple to 
implement and that the services are easy to compare given that the 
authorities have defined all aspects of the service in advance. Its popularity is 
also related to its success to deliver cost-efficient operations and thereby 
providing a solution to the problem of X-efficiency (Johansen et al 2001, 
Hensher and Houghton 2004). 
However, there are growing concerns regarding the development of service 
quality under such a regime. The weaknesses lie in the fact that the transport 
service cannot be developed during the period of the contract without the 
necessity for re-negotiation. At the same time, the operators’ interests are 
narrowed to the detail of internal cost efficient operations, with the 
consequences this inevitably entails for staffing costs such as salary and 
working conditions, which in reality are the aspects that have the greatest 
effect on costs. Both allow little room for dynamics and development of public 
transport provision over time, creating concerns over the regime’s ability to 
produce sufficient dynamic and service efficiency. 
In principal, this type of dynamic and service efficiency can be implemented in 
two separate periods: (i) at the tendering stage and (ii) in the contractual 
period. In both situations, greater or lesser responsibility can be allocated to 
the operators regarding the development of service provision. The level of 
freedom during the first period does not presuppose freedom of choice during 
the second, and vice versa. Nonetheless, freedom of choice can be 
combined: the operators can, for example, be given major opportunities to 
affect the service provision at the tendering stage and at the same time be 
allocated contracts with major incentives for developing further service 
provision after the allocation. However, most current tendering rounds for 
gross contracts take the totally opposite view, in that the operators are given 
few or no opportunities to design the service level either at the tendering stage 
or in the contractual period.  
C:\Documents and Settings\Vasco Reis\Desktop\Cila\Thredbo\WB\1107.doc 3 
 
3 QUALITY AT THE TENDERING STAGE – A TYPOLOGY 
Initiatives to introduce quality criteria and design freedom at the tendering 
stage have created a vast dispersion of tendering regimes in Europe today. 
While some have introduced quality criteria to supplement cost calculations 
within the framework of gross cost tendering, others have developed new and 
innovating tendering regimes making service and quality design the decisive 
criteria in the choice of operator. On the basis of factors relating to the 
tendering procedures four main forms of competitive tendering may be 
identified (see figure 1): 
 
Figure 1 Main forms of competitive tendering based on selection criteria and design freedom 
for the operator  
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the upper left corner in the figure, the service-design is pre-defined by the 
authorities and the operating costs remain the sole criteria for the choice of 
operator (“cost tendering”). Cost tendering is the standard competitive 
tendering regime referred to above, based on gross cost contracts as 
originally developed in London and Copenhagen. Nowadays, most areas 
have further elaborated this model by introducing some quality criteria as a 
supplement to the cost calculations. That is, they have moved their tendering 
model a bit closer to the right hand side of the figure.  
(design, frequency, tariff, information etc)
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Indirectly cost tendering
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(i.e. Telemark in Norway)
Diversification of design powers 
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The opposite extremity of the cost tendering model is found in the lower right 
corner of the figure, named as quality tendering. Quality tendering means that 
the service design and proposed quality is totally or partially decisive in the 
choice of operator. The operator is furthermore given great opportunities to 
develop the content of the service provision within a given geographical area 
(see section 4).  
Both cost tendering and quality tendering models have their mixture forms, 
defined as indirectly quality tendering in the lower right side of the figure and 
indirectly cost tendering in the upper right side. Indirectly quality tendering has 
its basis in the cost tendering regime, as price remain the decisive selection 
criteria. It indirectly promotes focus on quality matters, however, as the 
operators’ are allocated design freedoms and awarded net cost contracts with 
supply side incentives (see section 5). Similarly, indirectly cost tendering 
promotes focus on operating costs as the operators’ service design freedom is 
very limited and practically none existent, even though the quality criteria are 
decisive for the choice of operator. The concept of quality tendering is further 
developed in the next  section of the paper, as we present empirical evidence 
from trials with such a tendering regime.  
 
4 QUALITY TENDERING IN DUTCH PUBLIC TRANSPORT  
Following the enactment of the Passenger Transport Act 2000, the 
Netherlands has become one of the few countries in Europe to date that has 
tested tendering at the tactical level on a large scale. One of the aims of the 
Dutch reform was to enhance service quality improvements by giving more 
freedom to the operators (i.e. deregulation at the tactical level), in return for a 
clearer definition of the public transport goals by the authorities (i.e. regulation 
at the strategic level).ii 
As stated above, quality tendering means that the scope of the service 
provision and the proposed quality is totally or partially decisive in the choice 
of operator. Quality tendering may, however, be developed in a more or less 
strict sense, depending on the amount of design freedom delegated to the 
operators and exact shaping of the selection criteria. That is, whether the 
competition deals with a fixed line network or not – and whether the number of 
evaluation criteria is great or small. The main forms of quality tendering are 
summarised with their strengths and weaknesses in Table 1.  
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Table 1: Positive and negative characteristics of different forms of quality tendering 
Scope of competition Scope of criteria 
Fixed network Open network 
Many  Indirectly cost tendering 
(in Utrecht) 
 
+ steering and control 
+ predictability 
+ easy to compare 
+ cost cutting with equal route 
services 
 
- difficult to divide  
- no innovation in the line network 
- little innovation in tools 
- little/no increase in service 
provision 
Limited quality tendering  
(in Amersfoort) 
 
+ innovation in line network 
+ innovation in tools 
+ large increase in route provision 
for the same price 
 
 
- limited predictability 
- comparison is heavy on resources 
- asymmetric information 
 
Few Simple quality tendering  
(in Gelderland) 
 
+ predictable line network 
+ symmetric information 
+ easy to compare 
+ innovation in use of tools 
 
- no innovation in line network 
- limited increase in network 
provision 
 
 
Overall quality tendering  
(in Limburg) 
 
+ plenty of innovation in line network 
+ plenty of innovation in tools  
+ major increase in route service for 
the same price 
 
- little steering of growth in capacity  
- zero predictability 
- difficult to compare 
- asymmetric information 
- vulnerable to legal action 
 
The majority of evaluation criteria in the Dutch examples were linked to 
quantitative measurements such as regularity, reliability and frequency. At the 
same time there were major variations in how the “design tenders” were 
drawn up. Nonetheless it is possible to learn from this, and there is much to 
indicate that the following rules of thumb can be used as a starting point: (i) 
the more open the line network and the greater the operators room for 
manoeuvre, the greater the potential for innovation and increase in production 
volume, but also for greater costs linked with both evaluating the different 
tenders and control following the allocation of the contract, and (ii), the more 
evaluation criteria there are, the better the steering, control and predictability 
for the authorities – but also less potential for innovation in service provision 
and types of vehicles. The latter, combined with fixed route networks, is in fact 
very similar to more traditional forms of gross-cost tendering and price 
competition. Limiting the operators' room for manoeuvre also encourages cost 
cutting rather than rather than on service development and market innovation. 
The “indirect price competition” in Utrecht typically resulted in hefty cost 
cutting by the authorities on the same levels as the line network, creating 
results more in line with experiences from standard tendering of gross-cost 
contract with no freedom at the tactical level whatsoever (hence the label in 
the table).  The more open forms of competition in Amersfoort and Limburg, 
on the other hand, resulted in a 50- 60 per cent increase in service provision 
for the same price. 
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In drawing up the rules and criteria used in the competitive tender, the 
authorities need to find a balance between the need for increased competition 
and market-based solutions on the one hand and the need for control and 
supervision on the other. The more quality criteria which the authorities 
include in the conditions for the competition, the less room the operators will 
have for designing their own tender – and the more they will focus on their 
internal cost efficiency rather than on service development and market 
innovation. In the same way as in choosing between price and design 
competition at the tendering stage, the type and scope of the design 
competition is decisive for the result we will obtain at the end of the tender 
procedures.  
 
Low dynamic efficiency during the contractual period  
Even though the Dutch experiences showed several innovating and promising 
ways to introduce tactical freedom and competition at the tendering stage, 
none of the examples gave sufficient basis for a dynamic development of the 
service during the contractual period. Thus, design freedom at the tendering 
stage alone is not sufficient to secure innovation and service development 
over time. This can partly be explained by the fact that all the above-
mentioned examples were based on net-cost contracts during the operating 
period, without any further incentives for market development and increased 
patronage. The operators are thus faced with all the burdens of market 
failures without being offered real potential of earnings in correspondence with 
the risk they endure.  
This indicates that passenger income alone does not provide enough income 
potential for the operators in relation to the risk involved in developing and 
investing in new service provision. In principal, there are (at least) two ways to 
resolve this: reducing the income risk for the operators by returning to gross-
cost contracts, or increasing their income potential by adding further 
passenger incentives to the ticket income and thereby creating what might be 
called super-incentive contracts. In Telemark, Norway, they have chosen the 
latter alternative. 
The various choices stated above regarding contractual aspects, are 
illustrated in table 1 below. The introduction of super incentives to balance the 
risks the operators’ endure implies the construction of a net cost contract 
combined with additional incentives (indicating a move from bracket 3 to 4 in 
the table). The choice of reducing the income risk for the operators implies the 
creation of a gross cost tendering regime, either in its strictest form or with 
additional incentives (indicating a move from bracket 3 to 1 or 2 in the table). 
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Table 2 Competitive tendering according to contractual clauses 
Incentives beyond risk diversification Revenue risk 
No Yes 
Authorities 1. Gross cost 
tendering 
(The Scandinavian 
model) 
2. Extended gross 
cost tendering  
 
Operator 3. Net cost 
tendering 
4. Extended net cost 
tendering/indirectly 
quality tendering  
(as in Telemark, Norway) 
 
 
5 INDIRECTLY QUALITY TENDERING IN NORWAY 
“The scandinavian model”, with competitive tendering of gross cost contracts, 
is not the dominating model for Norway. One of the reasons are a high share 
of net contracts and strong market initiative for the operators. Another reason 
is the developments of performance contracts and output-based contracts in 
several of the major cities (Johansen et al 2001). The general framework of 
these performance contracts are an extended market responsibility for the 
operator and extended financial risk related to the output based subsidies. 
The output based subsidies are calibrated to combine profit maximisation and 
social welfare optimisation.  
While the tendering out of such a contract is a novel initiative, the 
performance-based model has been presented in earlier papers at the 
THREDBO-conferences (Norheim 1999, Larsen 2001, Carlquist 2001, 
Bråthen 2003). The model identifies a set of external effects that are typically 
not taken into account by the individual traveller when choosing transport 
mode (changes in congestion costs etc). The model is estimated by a two-
stage procedure, where the first stage determines fare levels, bus revenue-km 
and bus capacities to maximise a social welfare function based on the above 
mentioned external effects. The second stage calculates rates for fare 
subsidies and for revenue-km subsidies (applicable in the peak and/or 
periods), which will induce a profit-maximising operator to choose the socially 
optimum levels for revenue-km and bus capacities. Hence, a per-passenger 
subsidy “pays for results”, whilst the revenue-km payment reimburses some of 
the costs, creating a contract where the subsidy is set to match the sum of 
avoided external costs of car use and the benefits of increased service 
frequency (see Johansen and Norheim 1999, Johansen et al 2001 and 
Fearnley et al 2004 for further elaboration of the model). 
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Tendering the performance contracts 
These contracts are normally not tendered, but competitive pressures are built 
in the contracts. If the quality satisfaction index fall beyond a specified level 
will the contract is put out for tender. The general problem has been to 
develop a proper tendering system for these contracts. The best operator for 
these contracts is the market-oriented operator that is able to develop the 
service level according to the incentives, knowing the market demand and 
inventive market solutions. It is difficult to compare and evaluate different bids 
depending on expected service developments.  
In the following we will illustrate a tendering procedure for performance 
contracts in the twin-city of Skien/Porsgrunn in Telemark. The population are 
approximately 84.000 with a density of 1500 inhabitants/km2 and 39 PT trips 
per inhabitant per year. This is a medium sized Norwegian city but below the 
average PT trip frequency. They political target for increased ridership is 50 
PT trips per year in the short term and 70 trips per year in the long term. This 
is more up to the average level for similar cities in Norway. 
Our alternative has been to tender out the right to operate these performance 
contracts, and the operators expectations for market developments and 
revenue forecasts will influence the bids (. The tender is awarded to those 
who are willing to pay the authorities the highest annual sum to operate a 
contract with clearly defined incentives and freedom for market development.  
The revenue incentives are divided into three parts; frae box revenue, 
production incentives and passenger incentives (table 3). The operator are 
free to define the frequency, bus type and departure time, but not below the 
initial level. They are also free to define the fare structure but the average fare 
level must not be higher than initial level. 
 
Table 3: Revenue incentives included in the contract and estimated total income based on 
initial production and passenger level Euro 
 
With current service level and revenue incentives, an operator who pays 
approximately 5 mil euro to operate such a contract will maintain the current 
net subsidy (subsidy level of 45%). The net subsidy corresponds to the 
estimated revenue in table 2 and estimated normative costs for initial service 
level. If a competing operator estimate a lower cost for the operation (based 
on with smaller buses, more effective operation etc.) they might be willing to 
pay a higher price for the right to operate this service. Similarly an operator 
who sees the potential for passenger increase might be willing to pay a higher 
price for this contract.  
 incentives Million/year 
Fare box revenue (per passenger) 1.50 5.9 
Production incentives (vehicle km) 0.75 2.5 
Passenger incentives  (per passenger) 1.50 5.9 
Estimated income (mill/year)  14.2 
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The main advantage of this solution is that it combines demands for cost 
effectiveness in production with opportunities for market development during 
the contract period. In relation to many of the Dutch examples - where the 
quality criteria and different bids can be difficult to compare - the criterion here 
is as simple as in standard tenders: the winner is the one who offers the best 
price. However, the price is the result of the operators’ evaluation of the 
market potential and not simply a question of cost efficiency in its most narrow 
sense. This solution thus transfers power and steering capacity to the 
passengers to a far greater extent than in any other model, while the 
authorities can safeguard services by setting minimum requirements (in 
Telemark, the service must be at least as good as it was before).  
If there are no potential for market developments, this will be a normal net 
contract tendering with a higher revenue risk. The worst scenario therefore is 
that the service remains as it was before. If there are a potential for market 
development, this contract will put more focus on existing an potential 
passengers benefit based on the passenger incentives. 
 
The effect of Quality tendering in Telemark 
It is too early to conclude about the effect of quality tendering in Telemark. 
This is a dynamic contract and the long term effect will hopefully be evaluated 
in the end of the contract period. But there are some evidences already in the 
early stage of the contract, both regarding the tendering procedure and 
market development. 
 
Tendering procedure 
The tendering procedure introduced in Telemark was a compromise between 
the initial proposal and financial restrictions in the county. The tender was 
restricted by an upper ceiling of the subsidy level and they used a fixed bus 
network as a base level for the tender. All operators were invited to design 
and tender for alternative networks. 
Telemark County got three bids for the first round (two external and the 
existing operator). The county got some technical complaints according to the 
first tenders and had to organise a second round, with only two bids. The 
external operator delivered a complaint based on limited market information 
during the tendering process, but the complaint was not accepted.  
Our general impression based on the process is that the market information 
was far from sufficient and must be improved in future tenders if they want to 
increase number of bids. The existing operator had a strong competitive 
advantage based on this market knowledge and this type of contracts is more 
dependent on this information.  
The second problem was the “two-stage” tendering process. All the bids from 
the first round were official, and the operators were able to compare and 
adjust the bids. This might have influenced the drop out from one of the 
operators in the last round. But the technical problems in the first round was 
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not related to this type of tendering1, but more low experience in this type of 
tendering in Norway.  
 
Market developments 
The main objective of this type of quality tendering is to stimulate product 
developments and new market initiatives in the region. And the incentives are 
calibrated to combine welfare maximisation for the society with profit 
maximisation for the operator. It is interesting to observe that the operator 
have introduced a novel and very promising bus network for the region, 
named the “METROBUS”. They have reduced the number of bus lines from 
eight to three Metrobus-lines with 15 minutes frequency and four 
supplementary lines with low (hourly) frequency. The zonal fare system, 
varying from 2,7 to 7,9 euro per single ticket, are changed to a flat fare system 
of 2,4 euro per trip. Their market campaign use the slogan; “Double frequency 
- half the price”.  
The have invited the two local municipalities (Skien and Porsgrunn) to co-
finance this development (120.000 euro/year each). Our general impression is 
that this scheme might be too optimistic, and that they need to do adjustments 
during the contract period. But the general idea to simplify the network, 
increase frequency and reduce/simplify the fare structure is close to our 
earlier recommendations.  
 
 
5 CRITICAL REMARKS AND FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS 
This paper has presented two recent initiatives to introduce qualitative 
measures either in the tendering procedures or the contractual clauses, both 
aimed at delegating more service design freedom to the operator: The first 
initiative is taken from the Dutch experiences with tendering at the tactical 
level, and the second from the very first tendering of a performance-based 
subsidy contract in Norway.  
 
The Dutch experience 
The Dutch experiences offer several innovating and promising ways to 
introduce tactical freedom and competition at the tendering stage. Some of 
the examples even led to huge innovation and changes in design from 
previous networks and quite a large increase in service provision. However, 
the more quality criteria which the authorities include in the conditions for the 
competition, the less room the operators will have for designing their own 
tender – and the more they will focus on their internal cost efficiency rather 
than on service development and market innovation. Here the results become 
more in line with experiences from standard tendering of gross-cost contract 
with no freedom at the tactical level whatsoever.   
Furthermore, the Dutch evidence seems less convincing when it comes to 
service innovation during the contractual period, at least for the time being. 
                                                 
1 Appendix in an open envelope etc 
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This can partly be explained by the fact that all cases analysed relied on net-
cost contracts without any further incentives for market development. The 
operators are thus faced with all the burdens of market failures without being 
offered real potential of earnings in correspondence with the risks they 
endure.  
 
The Norwegian experience 
To tender out a performance-based subsidy contract, as used in the Telemark 
county of Norway, increases the income potential for the operators by 
introducing strong incentives in addition to ticket income. The operators 
subsequently bid for the right to operate contracts with such super-incentives 
and market-related freedoms that are included with them. The risk dilemma 
that revealed itself in the Dutch cases is thereby balanced by super-incentives 
for market development. In many respect this solution offers a novel and 
promising way of combining aims of cost and service efficient regime both at 
the static tendering stage and during the more dynamic contractual period.  
The main advantage of this solution is that it combines demands for cost 
effectiveness in production with opportunities for market development during 
the contract period. In relation to many of the Dutch examples - where the 
quality criteria and different bids can be difficult to compare - the criterion here 
is as simple as in standard gross cost tenders: the winner is the one who 
offers the best price. However, the price is the result of the operators’ 
expectations of the market potential and not simply a question of cost 
efficiency in its most narrow sense.  
However, there are also challenges linked with this kind of tender. Firstly, this 
is a demanding form of tender, where the existing operators have the best 
market knowledge and thus a competitive advantage. This is the most vital 
criticism to the tendering procedure in Telemark. It is of vital importance for 
this type of tendering that all interested parties have the same information 
about the market they want to serve. A further challenge is that many county 
councils have restricted budgets below the welfare optimal subsidy level. 
Telemark has therefore set an upper limit on subsidy payments.  
The first preliminary results of the Telemark tender are promising, and the 
incentives and level of freedom in the contract have stimulated the operator to 
develop a totally new PT network and fare structure. It is too early to evaluate 
and conclude if this is a sustainable service level, but they are moving in the 
right direction.  
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i The majority of gross contracts include one or more incentives to compensate for this condition, but in 
all cases these incentives are much weaker than the incentive that is included in net contracts with 
income responsibility.  
ii See van de Velde and Pruijmboom (2003) for further description of the Dutch reform in a nutshell. 
